Differentiating the Effects of Status and Power: A Justice Perspective

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Few empirical efforts have been devoted to differentiating status and power, and thus significant questions remain about differences in how status and power impact social encounters. We conducted 5 studies to address this gap. In particular, these studies tested the prediction that status and power would have opposing effects on justice enacted toward others. In the first 3 studies, we directly compared the effects of status and power on people’s enactment of distributive (Study 1) and procedural (Studies 2 and 3) justice. In the last 2 studies, we orthogonally manipulated status and power and examined their main and interactive effects on people’s enactment of distributive (Study 4) and procedural (Study 5) justice. As predicted, all 5 studies showed consistent evidence that status is positively associated with justice toward others, while power is negatively associated with justice toward others. The effects of power are moderated, however, by an individual’s other orientation (Studies 2, 3, 4, and 5), and the effects of status are moderated by an individual’s dispositional concern about status (Study 5). Furthermore, Studies 4 and 5 also demonstrated that status and power interact, such that the positive effect of status on justice emerges when power is low and not when power is high, providing further evidence for differential effects between power and status. Theoretical implications for the literatures on status, power, and distributive/procedural justice are discussed.

Keywords: status, power, hierarchy, justice, fairness

The dynamics that underlie hierarchical relations and social stratification among individuals represent some of the fastest growing research areas in social psychology and related sciences (Fiske, 2010; Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Hall, Coats, & LeBeau, 2005; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), and with good reason—hierarchy is a fundamental element of social life, one that emerges spontaneously and gives order and coordination to the dynamics within social collectives (Durkheim, 1893/1960; Fiske, 2010; Hall et al., 2005; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Marx, 1844/1959; Parson, 1961; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Weber, 1964) and impacts a wide range of important and beneficial individual outcomes (Ellis, 1994; Lin, 1990; Marmor, 2004; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974; Podolny, 2005; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). These consequences help explain individuals’ strivings to achieve high rank (Frank & Cook, 1995; Kemper, 2006) and highlight the importance of understanding the psychology of those at the top of the hierarchy (Blader & Chen, 2011; Chen, Brockner, & Greenberg, 2003).

Hierarchy, though, is not a unitary concept but, rather, can be based on a variety of dimensions. Two of the most prominent and fundamental hierarchical dimensions in the social sciences are status and power (Blau, 1964; Fiske, 2010; Kemper, 2006; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Weber, 1964), which have been discussed and differentiated in social science theorizing for decades (e.g., Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 2010; Goldhamer & Shils, 1939; Hall et al., 2005; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Ridgeway & Walker, 1995; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985). Prior theorizing has emphasized that status and power can be differentially derived, experienced, and utilized by individuals, and, thus, there are important conceptual differences between them. This strongly suggests that the psychology that relates to status and power differs and that an understanding of the psychology of those with higher hierarchical rank demands an understanding of the distinct psychology related to status and power (Blader & Chen, 2011).

However, despite prior theorizing and the clear importance of distinguishing status from power, much empirical research continues to use these constructs interchangeably. Few empirical efforts have differentiated status from power. Thus, significant questions remain about whether and how status and power differentially impact those holding them and the significance of those differences for social dynamics between high-ranked parties and their interaction counterparts. In the current research, we attempted to empirically distinguish status from power by examining their differential impact on the justice that higher ranked individuals extend to their lower ranked interaction partners. We did so with two primary goals. First, we hoped to contribute to research on the psychology of status and power by empirically distinguishing between these two critical elements of social hierarchy. Second, we hoped to contribute to research on justice by focusing on higher ranked justice actors—that is, the parties often charged with creating justice in the first place. This latter goal is important because, despite nearly 40 years of psychological research on justice, relatively little work has focused on the psychology of justice among higher ranked parties (Blader & Chen, 2011; Chen et al., 2003). Therefore, little is known about the determinants of whether justice actors—for example, civic leaders, policemen, or corporate managers—enact justice or injustice. We pursued these goals by ex-
a higher ranked party’s sense of his or her own status and/or power impacts the justice he or she enacts toward others.

**Status and Power**

Clearly defining status and power is a critical first step toward achieving conceptual clarity between them. Yet prior research has been somewhat equivocal in establishing definitions of status and power, fueling the tendency for them to be conflated with one another (Fiske, 2010; Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Hall et al., 2005; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985). In the current studies, we focused on theoretical developments that reflect long-standing perspectives in social psychology and related fields regarding the definition of status and power. These approaches define status as the prestige, respect, and esteem that a party has in the eyes of others (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Fiske, 2010; Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; see also Goldhamer & Shils, 1939; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Ridgeway, 2001; Ridgeway & Walker, 1995; Zelditch, 1968). Status is an index of the social worth that others ascribe to an individual or a group (Chen, Peterson, Phillips, Podolny, & Ridgeway, in press). Thus, status originates externally (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961) and is rooted in the evaluations of others through status-conferral processes (Ridgeway & Erickson, 2000).

In contrast, recent theoretical developments emphasize that power is best conceptualized as control over critical resources—that is, outcome control (Dépret & Fiske, 1993; Fiske, 2010; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Georgesen & Harris, 1998, 2000; Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Keltner et al., 2003; Overbeck & Park, 2001). This conceptualization emerges from a long history of defining power in varied ways, including dependence (Emerson, 1962); the potential to influence via rewards, coercion, expertise, legitimacy, and individual characteristics (French & Raven, 1959); and the ability to mobilize resources (Kanter, 1977). Compared with status, power is less reliant on the judgments and evaluations of others and is not as reliant on a conferral process; power is relatively more a property of the actor, while status is relatively more a property of co-actors and observers (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Notably, social influence is not an element of our conceptualization of either status or power, since we regard influence as a consequence of status and power, not an element inherent in the constructs themselves (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). This is important for distinguishing them since otherwise any exercise of social influence would indicate that the actor has both status and power, precluding efforts to differentiate them.

In the studies presented, we utilized these conceptualizations of status and power and examined their impact on how fairly people act toward their interaction partners. In so doing, we hoped to extend the primary focus of prior status and power research. For instance, prior status research has primarily focused on the benefits that are bestowed by lower status interaction partners (Fiske, 2010). Relatively less work has been conducted on how status shapes the way that status holders approach and interact with others, which was the focus of the current studies. Moreover, whereas the status literature has focused on the benefits that highly ranked individuals gain in social relations, the power literature has emphasized the intrapersonal effects of power on the cognition, emotions, and behaviors of power holders. Similar to the status literature, there has been relatively less work on the consequences of power on interpersonal dynamics, such as the fairness people extend to their interaction partners.

**Status and Justice Toward Others**

Since status is accompanied by a wide assortment of benefits, individuals possessing status will greatly value—and actively seek to maintain—their high-status position (Barkow, 1975; Blader & Chen, 2011; Harvey & Consalvi, 1960; Hogan & Hogan, 1991; Huberman, Loch, & Onculer, 2004; Jackman, 1994; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Schlenker & Gutek, 1987; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Troyer & Younts, 1997). While efforts to maintain one’s status can have a variety of consequences, a particularly important one is that status-maintenance concerns can draw an individual’s attention outward to social targets in the environment (Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006). This may occur because status derives from evaluations by others; one can have status only if others confer it (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; Homans, 1961). This reasoning is consistent with arguments that feelings of respect and pride, which accompany high-status positions, are socially defined and, thus, reliant on others. As a result, such feelings prompt high-status individuals to be concerned about the impressions they cultivate with social targets, to consider these parties’ perspectives, and to act in ways that will be regarded as respectable and commendable. Doing so helps perpetuate others’ admiration and status conferral to the high-status individual (Flynn et al., 2006; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001).

Enacting justice in encounters with others is a primary approach by which high-status parties can attempt to ensure that their lower ranked interaction partners continue to regard them as respectable and commendable. Justice has consistently been shown to affect lower ranked peoples’ evaluations of higher ranked individuals, impacting judgments of legitimacy (Tyler & Lind, 1992), satisfaction (Brockner, Chen, Mannix, Leung, & Skarlicki, 2000), and support (Chen et al., 2003). Since people value justice and regard those who enact it as virtuous and worthy of respect (Folger, 1987), higher ranked parties who distribute resources fairly and make decisions fairly are likely to be seen by their lower ranked counterparts as deserving of respect and esteem. Related to this, norms often dictate that higher ranked parties should act in an honorable and just manner toward others (Blau, 1964). When these individuals act in accordance with the norms of their position, the status and esteem associated with their position are ascribed to them. Moreover, since status orient status holders outward and makes them more attentive to others, they are more likely and better able to think about the perspectives and needs of their interaction partners. This may make them more attuned to how their decisions impact others and may prompt them to take into account others’ points of view and to be sensitive to the quality of treatment they extend to others. These are important precursors to fairness. In sum, we argue that high-status individuals will be more likely to enact justice since their status-maintenance concerns make them more attentive to others and more likely to act in ways that others find respectable and commendable.

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1 It has been noted that some individual characteristics, such as referent power, may be more closely aligned with conceptualizations of status than of power, since they may derive from the person’s persona or social status.
Power and Justice Toward Others

A vast body of literature demonstrates the profound impact that power can have on cognition and on how people orient themselves toward others. This work emphasizes that power liberates people from social and normative pressures, leading them to shift their focus inward and toward their own goals and dispositions (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; Guinote, 2007; Keltner et al., 2003). For many powerful individuals, this prompts an egocentric orientation to social encounters (Fiske, 2010; Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; Lee & Tiedens, 2001), making those with power less attentive and less likely to individuate others (Fiske, 1993; Galinsky et al., 2006; Galinsky et al., 2008; Gruenfeld et al., 2008; cf. Overbeck & Park, 2001; Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009). Further, since power emboldens people to adopt a much stronger approach and promotion orientation (Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003; Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007), we expect that many high-power people may set aside relational dynamics that they regard as peripheral to the achievement of their goals. And to the limited extent that high-power parties do attend to other social targets, they may view those targets in more critical, devaluing ways (Georgeson & Harris, 1998, 2000; Kipnis, 1972) and focus on the instrumentality of those targets (Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Overbeck & Park, 2006). Overall, power may make people less likely to attend to, engage with, or value their relations with lower power counterparts or those counterparts’ needs, perspectives, and opinions.

The consequences of power for social perception are directly counter to the consequences of status. Whereas status heightens attention to others’ needs and views, power can lead to the exact opposite effects. As a result, we predicted that power would be negatively related to justice, and, thus, power and status would have opposing effects on justice behaviors toward others. Specifically, we argue that tendencies to be less attentive to others’ needs and perspectives, to focus primarily on one’s egocentric goals, and to focus on relations with others solely as a means to achieving one’s ends would converge to make high-power individuals less likely to treat others fairly. Moreover, these processes may even prevent them from caring about norms to act fairly that accompany their role and from being likely (or able) to reason about justice from others’ perspectives. Indeed, justice reasoning relies largely on overcoming one’s egocentric focus (Hoffman, 2000). Discrepancies in justice reasoning may be further exacerbated by tendencies of high-power people to be relatively critical and dismissive of the contributions and abilities of those lower in power (Georgeson & Harris, 1998; Kipnis, 1972), leading them to regard their low-power counterparts as less worthy and less deserving of justice.

Central to our theorizing about the negative effect of power on justice behaviors is that power prompts liberation from social and normative pressures, creating great latitude in how the powerful approach and think about social relations. Much prior research demonstrates that this liberation increases the social and psychological distance that high-power individuals perceive between themselves and their low-power counterparts (Lee & Tiedens, 2001). We proposed that this perceived distance could lead high-power parties to act relatively less fairly toward others. However, a significant stream of power research emphasizes that this is not an inevitable consequence of power. Rather, this work suggests that the primary consequence of power holders’ liberation from social and normative pressures is the opportunity for the self to be the predominant guide to social behavior and, thus, for high-power individuals to act in more trait-consistent ways (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001; Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Galinsky et al., 2008; Keltner et al., 2003; Schmid Mast et al., 2009).

While this latitude results in egocentric social perception and behavior for many individuals, others may react quite differently to possessing power. In particular, individuals who are dispositionally other-oriented—that is, predisposed to be attentive to social relations and concerned about others—may have quite different reactions to experiencing high power (Chen et al., 2001; Schmid Mast et al., 2009; Howard, Gardner, & Thompson, 2007; van Dijk & DeCremer, 2006). The liberation from normative pressures may enable powerful individuals to express their other orientation, and so they may show attentiveness to, understanding of, and concern for others. Therefore, we expected that power holders with a strong other orientation would be less likely to be unfair toward others. That is, we predicted that a power holder’s other orientation would moderate the negative effect of power on justice, such that the effect would emerge primarily among those with relatively weaker other orientation.

Overall, we predicted that the effect of power on justice behavior would vary. Consistent with a dominant stream of research on power, we theorized that power creates distance and disassociation between high-power parties and their lower power counterparts, which would lead the former to treat the latter relatively less fairly. Further, consistent with a significant stream of research that highlights the importance of power holders’ dispositions, we also predicted that an individual’s dispositional other orientation would moderate the negative effect of power on justice.

The Present Research

The five studies that follow test our predictions that status and power would have opposing effects on justice behavior and that the effect of power would be moderated by an individual’s dispositional other orientation. To enhance generalizability, we examine both distributive and procedural justice, as well as several related elements of the interaction, in these studies. Distributive justice refers to the fairness of how resources and other benefits are allocated; procedural justice refers to the fairness of the processes by which decisions are made and communicated, as well as the quality of treatment that accompanies those decision-making processes (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, Degoye, & Smith, 1996). In the first three studies, we directly compare the effect of status and power on distributive (Study 1) and procedural (Studies 2 and 3) justice. In the latter two studies, we build off these results and adopt a more comprehensive approach by orthogonally manipulating status and power and by examining the main and interactive effects between them, again on both distributive (Study 4) and procedural (Study 5) justice. Given the paucity of empirical work distinguishing status from power, we take an exploratory approach to examining their interactive effects. Evidence of interactive effects between them would further support their differentiation.

A diverse range of experimental paradigms are used in the following studies. Study 1 serves as an initial test of our hypotheses, examining status and power in a dictator game paradigm.
Studies 2 and 5 examine our hypotheses in a more complex and engaging context, a dyadic negotiation. In Studies 3 and 4, we further extend our examination by having participants engage in leadership role-playing simulations.

Study 1

Intended as a preliminary test of our hypotheses, Study 1 utilized a dictator game paradigm, in which each participant was asked to divide $10 between himself or herself and someone else.

Method

Participants and design. Participants were 45 students pursuing a master’s degree in business administration who took part in this study as an in-class activity. The average age of participants was 31 years, and 30% of the participants were women.

Procedure. The study consisted of a three-condition between-subjects design (status, power, and control). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions. A dictator game paradigm (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994) was used, in which there were, ostensibly, allocators and receivers. In reality, all participants were in the allocator role. The experimental materials explained that, as allocators, they were to decide how to divide $10 between themselves and an anonymous recipient (they were told that predetermined codes would be used to match allocators and recipients once allocation decisions had been made).

Independent variable. The manipulations were presented after the instructions but prior to participants making their allocation decisions. In the written instructions for the status condition, we highlighted the status associated with the allocator role: “Given the set up of this exercise, it is obvious that the allocator commands high status; that is, he or she is regarded with greater esteem, respect, and admiration from others.” In the power condition, participants instead read: “Given the set up of this exercise, it is obvious that the allocator commands a great deal of power, that is, he or she controls the most critical resource allocation decision here.” In the control condition, the participants received no information about the role prior to making their allocation decisions.

Dependent variable. The dependent variable was the percentage of the $10 that participants said they would give to their recipients.

Results and Discussion

Analysis of variance revealed a significant effect of our independent variable on participants’ allocation decisions. $F(2, 42) = 7.69, p < .001, \eta^2 = .27$. As predicted, average allocation decisions in the status condition ($M = 42.71\%$, $SD = 14.73$) were significantly greater than in both the power condition ($M = 19.87\%, SD = 15.94$), $F(1, 42) = 15.35, p < .001, \eta^2 = .27$, and the control condition ($M = 29.67\%, SD = 16.96$), $F(1, 42) = 4.86, p < .05, \eta^2 = .10$. The power and control conditions were marginally different from one another, $F(1, 42) = 2.93, p < .10, \eta^2 = .07$.

These findings provide preliminary support for our hypotheses. Framing the allocator role in terms of status led participants to make allocation decisions that were more egalitarian (compared with both control and power conditions) and, thus, that suggested greater concern for justice. This finding is consistent with our argument that status orients people outward and makes them more likely to act fairly toward others. Note that framing the allocator role in terms of power had a marginally significant negative effect on allocations, compared with the control condition. Given the nature of the dictator game—and, in particular, the unilateral and complete control on the part of the allocators—it is surprising that the power framing had any effect. Yet, despite the power already associated with the role, explicitly framing the allocator role in terms of power appears to have further enhanced the tendency to make self-serving allocations.

While consistent with our predictions, the findings of Study 1 are highly preliminary. Participants did not actually interact with another party, so it was not clear whether the status/power effect would emerge in the context of an actual and more engaging interaction. Additionally, we did not have any dispositional data in Study 1 and, thus, were unable to determine whether the effect of power varies as a function of an individual’s other orientation. Study 2 addresses these issues and tests our hypotheses in a more involving, complex dynamic.

Study 2

Study 2 was designed to more extensively explore the impact of status and power on justice in the context of a dyadic negotiation. In Study 2, we explore the impact of status and power not only on justice but also on an important element of the negotiation dynamic: the likelihood of making the first offer in the negotiation. First offers are important because they have a critical impact on the final outcome of a negotiation (Galinsky, 2004). Furthermore, prior power research has conceptualized first offers as an important index of proactive, approach-oriented behavior (Magee et al., 2007). This prior research predicts and finds that power increases the likelihood that an individual will make the first offer, consistent with the power-approach theory of behavior (Keltner et al., 2003). Since our reasoning specified that status increases people’s focus on others and prompts them to act in ways that others find respectful and appropriate, we predicted that status would curtail individuals’ tendency to make the first offer since first offers might make them seem overly aggressive and self-focused.

Method

Participants and design. Participants were 188 students from the northeastern United States pursuing a master’s degree in business administration who were enrolled in a negotiations course. Participants were 28 years old, on average, and 41% were women. The study design included three conditions (status, power, and control).

Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions. The study was based on the Synertech-Dosagen negotiation simulation exercise (Greenhalgh, 1993), a dyadic negotiation in which each of the parties plays the role of the chief financial officer of one of two pharmaceutical firms that are meeting to discuss the sale of a manufacturing plant. The negotiation is primarily distributive in nature, with the critical issue being the sale price of the plant. Participants were randomly...
assigned to buyer and seller roles and were provided with role materials that included a description of their character and information about the circumstances surrounding the negotiation. The experimental manipulations were embedded within the buyer’s role materials. Participants (in both roles) were unaware of any differences among the buyers’ role materials. 

Buyers and sellers were randomly paired with one another and spent up to 25 min negotiating with their interaction partner. When their negotiations concluded, they completed a questionnaire that contained the dependent variables and were then debriefed.

**Experimental conditions.** Our manipulations were based on our conceptualization of status as social regard and of power as resource or outcome control. Participants in the status condition contained the dependent variables and were then debriefed. Their negotiations concluded, they completed a questionnaire that you have a great deal of esteem from others.

Participants in the power condition were informed

You are quite well known in the industry as a powerful individual. You are one of the most well known in the industry. People really hold you in high regard, and you have a great deal of esteem from others.

No information about status or power was provided in the control condition. For the analyses, our independent variable was coded such that power = −1, control = 0, and status = 1.

**Dispositional measures.** To test our hypothesis that power interacts with an individual’s dispositional other orientation, we asked participants completed a questionnaire (2 weeks prior to participation in the study) that assessed two indices of other orientation, one primarily cognitive and the other primarily affective. Our cognitively focused index of other orientation was relational self-construal (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000), or the extent to which individuals have a propensity to define themselves through their relationships with others. This makes them more attentive to others’ perspectives and needs (Cross et al., 2000; Cross & Morris, 2003); thus, we expected power would not be negatively related to justice toward others among individuals high in relational self-construal (Howard et al., 2003). Our affective index of other orientation was empathic concern (Davis, 1983), or the extent to which individuals tend to experience emotions that reflect connectedness to others. We expected that our predicted negative effect of power on justice would not emerge among those high in empathic concern.

We measured relational self-construal using the Relational Interdependence Self-Construal (RISC) Scale of Cross, Bacon and Morris (2000). Sample items include “In general, my close relationships are an important part of my self-image” and “My close relationships are an important reflection of who I am.” We measured empathic concern using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983). Sample items include “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me” and “I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.”

**Manipulation checks.** Participants answered two questions to verify the success of our experimental manipulations: “How much status did the character or role you were playing have?” and “How much power did the character or role you were playing have?” Both questions were answered on a scale ranging from 1 (very little) to 7 (a great deal). As an additional check on our status condition, we also asked respondents, “How important was it to you that your negotiation opponent show respect for you during the negotiation?” (scale ranging from 1 [not at all] to 7 [very]).

**Dependent variables.**

*Procedural justice.* Our primary dependent variable was sellers’ ratings of the procedural justice they encountered from the buyer during the negotiation—that is, our procedural justice ratings were based on sellers’ independent ratings of the procedural justice of the buyers. Sellers rated the procedural justice they encountered using a scale from the Subjective Value Inventory (Curhan, Elfenbein & Xu, 2006), an instrument designed to assess judgments that follow from a negotiation. The items focus on the procedural justice elements of voice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975) and consideration (Lind & Tyler, 1988), as well as an overall judgment of procedural justice. More specifically, sellers provided their responses to each of the following items, using a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (perfectly): “Do you feel your counterpart listened to your concerns?” “Did your counterpart consider your wishes, opinions, or needs?” and “Would you characterize the negotiation process as fair?” (α = .71).

*First offers and final agreements.* To test our prediction that status has a different effect than power on the likelihood that negotiators will initiate the first offer (Magee et al., 2007), we asked participants to report who made the first offer and the amount of that first offer.2 We also asked participants to report the amount of their final agreement.

**Results**

Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The analyses that follow, as well as those in all subsequent studies, were repeated by controlling for gender and examining whether gender interacted with our independent variable. Neither approach revealed an effect for gender, and thus gender is not included in any of the analyses presented.

**Manipulation checks.** Responses to our two manipulation checks indicate that we were successful in creating a sense of high power and high status in the respective experimental conditions. Experimental condition significantly impacted our power manipulation check, $F(2, 91) = 5.85, p < .01, \eta^2 = .21$, with significantly higher responses in the power condition ($M = 5.86, SD = 0.77$) than in the control condition ($M = 4.85, SD = 1.18$), $F(1, 91) = 8.54, p < .01, \eta^2 = .16$, or the status condition ($M = 4.69, SD = 0.86$), $F(1, 91) = 9.35, p < .01, \eta^2 = .18$). Similarly, responses to our status manipulation check were significantly impacted by experimental condition, $F(2, 91) = 3.60, p < .05, \eta^2 = .15$, with significantly higher responses in the status condition ($M = 6.46, SD = 0.78$) than in the control condition ($M = 5.47, SD = 0.96$), $F(1, 91) = 5.95, p < .05, \eta^2 = .12$, or the power condition ($M = 5.46, SD = 1.56$), $F(1, 91) = 5.13, p < .05, \eta^2 = .11$. Experimental condition likewise impacted our question about

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2 Given our focus on the behavior of those possessing status or power, in the following analyses, we focus on the amounts of the first offers when the buyer made the first offer.
the importance of being shown respect, $F(2, 91) = 4.24, p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .16$, with significantly higher responses in the status condition ($M = 6.15, SD = 0.80$) than in the control condition ($M = 4.85, SD = 1.50$), $F(1, 91)=7.44, p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .15$, or the power condition ($M = 4.93, SD = 1.49$), $F(1, 91) = 5.62, p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .11$. Responses on these two items confirm that respondents understood themselves to have higher status and that this made them more concerned about others acting in a way that validated their status. This supports the success of our status manipulation and our reasoning that status prompts a desire for social information informing one’s status position.

**Procedural justice.** Results of an analysis of variance confirmed our key hypothesis regarding the effect of status and power on justice. Sellers’ ratings of the procedural justice they experienced significantly varied as a function of whether the buyer was in the status, power, or control condition, $F(2, 91) = 12.36, p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .21$. More specifically, responses on this scale were significantly higher in the status condition ($M = 5.84, SD = 0.57$) than in the control condition ($M = 5.42, SD = 0.75$), $F(1, 91) = 4.35, p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .05$, or the power condition ($M = 5.01, SD = 0.85$), $F(1, 91) = 24.69, p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .21$; the control and power conditions were also significantly different from one another, $F(1, 91) = 3.99, p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .04$.

We next tested our prediction that the effect of power would vary as a function of participants’ other orientation, as indexed by their level of RISC and empathic concern. To conduct this test, we first used regression analysis to determine whether our experimental conditions interacted with RISC in predicting procedural fairness. That is, we followed the procedures recommended by Aiken & West (1991) and performed a regression analysis that included our experimental condition variable, participants’ RISC scores, and their interaction. This analysis revealed a significant effect of experimental condition ($\beta = .48, p < .001$), a significant effect of RISC ($\beta = .21, p < .05$), and a significant two-way interaction between them ($\beta = -.31, p < .001$). We then examined the simple slopes of our experimental conditions on procedural fairness at 1 standard deviation above and below the mean on RISC; the result of this analysis is presented in Figure 1. As expected, among those low in RISC, experimental condition had a significant impact on procedural fairness (i.e., power led to relatively less fairness, while status led to relatively greater fairness; $b = 0.78, p < .001$). In contrast, among those high in RISC, experimental condition did

![Figure 1](image-url). Study 2. RISC = Relational Interdependence Self-Construal Scale; EC = empathic concern.
not have a significant effect (b = 0.20, ns). Consistent with our predictions, this interaction was driven by differences in the effect of power on procedural justice as a function of RISC. High-power participants who were also high in RISC were rated by their interaction partners as being as fair as their high-status counterparts, whereas pronounced differences among power, control, and status conditions emerged among those low in RISC.

Next, we conducted a similar set of analyses to determine if empathic concern moderated the effect of our experimental conditions on procedural fairness. We performed a regression analysis that included our experimental condition variable, participants’ empathic concern scores, and their interaction. This analysis revealed significant effects of experimental condition (β = .51, p < .001) and empathic concern (β = .26, p < .01), and a significant two-way interaction between them (β = −.23, p < .05). We then examined the simple slopes of our experimental conditions on procedural fairness at 1 standard deviation above and below the mean on empathic concern; the result of this analysis is also presented in Figure 1. As expected, experimental condition had a stronger impact on those low in empathic concern (b = 0.59, p < .001) than on those high in empathic concern (b = 0.25, p < .05). Figure 1 demonstrates that this interaction was driven by differences in the effect of power on procedural justice as a function of empathic concern. The relative unfairness of high-power participants (compared with those in the control and status conditions) was attenuated among those who were also high in empathic concern.

**First offers and final agreements.** Logistic regression analysis was used to examine whether the experimental conditions affected the likelihood of the buyer making the first offer. The results of this analysis revealed our predicted effect, B = −0.52, p < .05, exp(B) = .59, indicating that those in the status condition were much less likely to make the first offer than their counterparts in the power condition. Indeed, buyers in the power condition were quite likely to make the first offer (i.e., they made the first offer 67% of the time), much more so than buyers in the status condition (41%). Buyers in the control condition were about as likely as their counterparts (41%) to make the first offer. When participants believed that they were playing a high-status role, they made the first offer much more than when their counterparts believed that they were playing a high-power role. Consistent with our theorizing, when our participants did make the first offer, the magnitude of those offers was not affected by experimental condition, likely reflecting a selection bias. Also notable was that experimental condition had no effect on the amount of the final agreements.

**Discussion**

Study 2 provides strong support for our hypotheses. First, we found evidence that status and power exert differential effects on procedural justice, as well as on approach-oriented behaviors such as making the first offer. Consistent with our theorizing, when participants believed that the character they were playing was high status and, thus, respected and well-regarded, they acted in a more procedurally fair manner toward their negotiation partners, compared to participants in the control and power conditions. Furthermore, when participants believed that they were playing a high-power character—someone with access to and control over a lot of resources—they acted in a less procedurally fair manner, compared with participants in the control and status conditions. These results indicate that status and power exert opposing effects on procedural justice. Our results further indicate that the effects of power change considerably as a function of an individual’s dispositional orientation toward others. Among individuals high in relational self-construal or high in empathic concern, these negative effects of power (compared with control and status conditions) were attenuated.

Study 2 also provided an opportunity to examine the effects of power and status on another dependent variable, namely whether the individual made the first offer. Like procedural justice, first offers represent an important element of the interpersonal dynamics between parties, one that also reflects how they approach and interact with others. At the same time, first offers are quite different from procedural justice; they are an indicator of an individual’s approach orientation (Magee et al., 2007), while procedural justice is an indicator of the quality of the relationship between the parties (Tyler & Lind, 1992). While prior research has shown that power increases an individual’s likelihood of making a first offer, we found that status exerts the opposite effect. This is consistent with our reasoning that status holders demonstrate an increased focus on others and a decreased focus on their own instrumental goals. Notably, when our participants did make the first offer, the magnitude of those offers was not affected by experimental condition, likely reflecting a selection bias. Also notable was that experimental condition had no effect on the amount of the final agreements.

In Study 2, we used a negotiation paradigm, building on prior justice research that has focused on negotiation contexts (e.g., Brockner, Decremer, van den Bos, & Chen, 2005; Brockner et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2003; Leung, Tong, & Ho, 2004) and negotiation research and theorizing that has emphasized the critical role of justice (e.g., Bazerman, 2005; Curhan et al., 2006; Lind, 1999; Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2003; Murnighan & Pillutla, 1995). This prior work reflects that justice is a fundamental concern across all social encounters (Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Hsu, 1997), particularly when trust, uncertainty, and relationships matter, as they do in most negotiations (Tyler & Blader, 2004). Indeed, fairness is a primary concern even in encounters in which one would expect self-interest to dominate (Kahneman, Ketsch, & Thaler, 1986). Nevertheless, it would be valuable to examine status and power in a context in which self-interest concerns were less relevant. As a result, Study 3 moves beyond the interpersonal negotiation context and tests our hypotheses by focusing on the fairness of group authorities.

**Study 3**

In Study 3, we examined a common, yet challenging, situation that has been a significant focus of prior justice research (e.g., Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Patient & Skarlicki, 2010; Rus, Galinsky, & Magee, 2011), a situation that high-ranked parties often encounter: communicating negative news to a group member. In addition to comparing the effect of status and power on the justice of how higher ranked parties often encounter: communicating negative news to a group member. In addition to comparing the effect of status and power on the justice of how higher ranked parties often encounter: communicating negative news to a group member. That is, we considered the impact of status and power on the justice of the interpersonal encounter as well as their impact on how higher ranked parties approach those encounters.
Method

Participants and design. Participants were 77 working adults recruited from a national sample of survey respondents maintained by a private online research firm. The study was completed online in exchange for $6 payment. The average age of the participants was 42 years; 57% were women. They had an average of 22 (SD = 12.24) years of work experience. They were randomly assigned to one of our three experimental conditions (status, power, control).

Procedure. The paradigm of Study 3 was based on one used in prior justice research (Patient & Skarlicki, 2010) in which participants play the role of a vice-president of sales at a medium-sized firm who faces the task of communicating negative news to one of his or her subordinates via a written memo. Participants were provided with role information (which contained our experimental manipulations) and were asked to approach their writing task as if they were the person described in the role. It was explained that the negative news that they had to convey was related to laying off one of their employees. As in Patient & Skarlicki (2010), participants were given extensive information about the situation leading up to the layoff that was designed such that the need for the layoff could be attributed to both the organization (through poor managerial decisions) and the employee (through mediocritie performance). This ensured that the employee was neither an innocent victim (spurring high levels of sympathy) nor wholly to blame (which might alleviate the perceived importance of justice). As such, the materials justified a range of approaches to the task and, thus, a range in participants’ feeling compelled to enact justice. To justify the written mode of communication and the experimental task, it was explained that the character they were portraying had a heavy workload and was currently away from the office, preventing communication of the news in person.

Participants then wrote the layoff memos to the hypothetical employee, after which they completed a questionnaire that contained our manipulation checks and dependent variables. After completing the questionnaire, they were thanked and debriefed regarding the experiment.

Experimental conditions. As noted, our experimental manipulations were embedded in the character description provided to participants. In the status condition, participants read that the character they were portraying

hold[s] a great deal of status within your organization. Indeed, you are one of the most respected individuals in the company, since the sales area is so highly regarded within the organization. You are personally held in very high esteem among everyone in the organization, even compared with your peers who hold other departments.

In the power condition, participants read that the character they were portraying

hold[s] a great deal of power within your organization. Indeed, you are one of the most powerful individuals in the company, since the sales area is so critical to the organization’s revenue stream. You are personally given control over a great deal of the organization’s resources, compared with your peers who head other departments.

No additional information was included in the control condition. In the analyses presented, our independent variable is coded such that power = −1, control = 0, and status = 1.

Dispositional measures. As in Study 2, our dispositional measures of other orientation were relational self-construal and empathic concern.

Manipulation checks. We used the two manipulation-check items from Study 2 that directly inquired about the perceived amount of power and status held by the character the participants were role-playing.

Dependent variables.

Procedural justice. Consistent with prior research (Patient & Skarlicki, 2010; Rus et al., 2011), we emphasized treatment elements of procedural justice (Blader & Tyler, 2003) in assessing the justice demonstrated in communicating news of the layoff. In particular, we assessed the procedural justice of the layoff memos by having two independent raters (who were blind to the experimental conditions) take the perspective of the recipient of the memo and rate, on a scale from 1 to 5, the extent to which the author of the memo “(a) was polite and courteous; (b) treated you with dignity and respect; (c) expressed concern for you (i.e., acknowledged the hardship the layoff might cause); and (d) overall, treated you fairly in this layoff.” The level of agreement between the raters, as measured by an intraclass correlation coefficient (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979), was .84 and, thus, the ratings were averaged (α = .93) to form a composite score for each memo.

Other measures. We examined two additional dependent variables to gain further insight into the effect of status and power on how participants approached this encounter. The first was a five-item measure that assessed the perceived importance of procedural justice elements to the participant. In particular, participants indicated the importance they placed on the following: (a) the recipient feeling that the layoff decision was communicated fairly, (b) the recipient feeling that the layoff decision was made fairly, (c) communicating the reasons for the layoff decision, (d) the consideration shown for the recipient’s feelings and family situation, and (e) if circumstances permitted, the importance they would place on giving voice to the recipient prior to a decision being made (α = .75). The second dependent variable was a four-item measure assessing their attentiveness toward the recipient, asking them the extent to which they were attentive about (a) the recipient’s reaction to the layoff, (b) the recipient’s feelings, (c) the recipient’s respect for them after reading the memo, and (d) whether the recipient liked them after reading the memo (α = .85).

Results

Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.

Manipulation checks. Responses to our manipulation-check items confirmed the success of our manipulations. Our power manipulation check was significantly affected by experimental condition, F(2, 74) = 4.27, p < .05, η² = .10, with significantly higher responses in the power condition (M = 6.39, SD = 1.16) than in the control (M = 5.36, SD = 1.13), F(1, 74) = 7.91, p < .01, η² = .10, or status (M = 5.59, SD = 1.58), F(1, 74) = 4.74, p < .05, η² = .06, conditions. The control and status conditions were not significantly different from one another, F(1, 74) = 0.38, ns. Similarly, our status manipulation check was significantly affected by experimental condition, F(2, 74) = 5.41, p < .01, η² = .13, with significantly higher responses in the status condition (M = 6.42, SD = 0.90) than in the control (M = 5.39, SD = 1.23), F(1, 74) = 8.77, p < .01, η² = .11, or power (M = 5.43, SD =
Table 2

Study 3: Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations Between Scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Status, power, control</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Procedural justice</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Perceived importance of procedural justice</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Concern for recipient</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Relational self-construal</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Empathic concern</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. N = 77. All correlations ≥.25 are significant at p < .05.
* Coded as power = −1, control = 0, status = 1.

1.65, F(1, 74) = 7.31, p < .01, \( \eta^2 = .09 \), conditions. The control and power conditions were not significantly different from one another, F(1, 74) = 0.01, ns.

Procedural justice. Results of analysis of variance confirmed our key hypothesis regarding the effect of status and power on ratings of the procedural justice of participants’ layoff memos. Ratings varied significantly by experimental condition, \( F(2, 74) = 8.55, p < .001, \eta^2 = .19 \), with significantly more positive ratings of justice in the status condition (\( M = 3.08, SD = 0.52 \)) than in the control (\( M = 2.80, SD = 0.38 \)), \( F(1, 74) = 5.13, p < .05, \eta^2 = .07 \)) or power (\( M = 2.56, SD = .40; F(1, 74) = 17.03, p < .001, \eta^2 = .19 \)) conditions; the control and power conditions were also significantly different from one another, \( F(1, 74) = 4.02, p < .05, \eta^2 = .05 \).

We next examined our prediction that the effect of power on justice would vary as a function of participants’ relational self-construal and empathic concern. We followed the same procedure outlined in Study 2, first examining whether experimental condition interacted with participants’ RISC scores in predicting procedural results. This analysis revealed a significant effect of experimental condition (\( \beta = .41, p < .001 \)) and a significant interaction of experimental condition and RISC (\( \beta = -.30, p < .01 \)). We next examined the simple slopes of our experimental conditions at one standard deviation above and below the mean on RISC, presented in Figure 2. As expected, experimental condition had a significant impact on justice among those low in RISC (\( b = 0.39, p < .001 \)), but not among those high in RISC (\( b = 0.01, ns \)). Those in the power condition who were high in relational self-construal wrote memos that were rated as equivalent in fairness to the memos written by their counterparts in the status condition.

We next conducted the same set of analyses, this time examining the moderating role of empathic concern. Regression analysis revealed significant main effects for experimental condition (\( \beta = .36, p < .001 \)), empathic concern (\( \beta = .27, p < .001 \)), and their interaction (\( \beta = -.20, p < .001 \)). The simple slopes (presented in Figure 2) indicate that, as expected, experimental condition had a significant effect among those low in empathic concern (\( b = 0.28, p < .001 \)) but not among those high in empathic concern (\( b = 0.06, ns \)). Once again, this was due to the finding that those high in empathic concern in the power condition had their memos rated as equivalently fair to the memos written by their counterparts in the status condition.

Perceived importance of procedural justice. We next examined the effect of the experimental conditions on participants’ perceived importance of procedural justice elements. We found a significant effect of experimental condition, \( F(2, 74) = 12.51, p < .001, \eta^2 = .25 \), with those in the status condition expressing significantly more concern with the elements that define procedural justice (\( M = 6.10, SD = 0.85 \)), compared with those in the control (\( M = 5.37, SD = 0.71 \)), \( F(1, 74) = 8.82, p < .01, \eta^2 = .11 \), or the power (\( M = 4.83, SD = 1.13 \)), \( F(1, 74) = 24.66, p < .001, \eta^2 = .25 \)); the control and power conditions were also significantly different from one another, \( F(1, 74) = 4.74, p < .05, \eta^2 = .06 \). We then examined whether this effect was moderated by relational self-construal. Regression analysis indicated significant effects of experimental condition (\( \beta = .42, p < .001 \)), RISC (\( \beta = .36, p < .001 \)), and their interaction (\( \beta = -.21, p < .05 \)). The simple slopes indicated that, as expected, there was a significant effect of experimental condition when relational self-construal was low (\( b = 0.71, p < .001 \)) but not when it was high (\( b = 0.15, ns \)). Similarly, regression analysis examining the mod-

Figure 2. Study 3. RISC = Relational Interdependence Self-Construal Scale; EC = empathic concern.
erating effects of empathic concern indicated significant effects of experimental condition ($\beta = .36$, $p < .001$), empathic concern ($\beta = .50$, $p < .001$), and their interaction ($\beta = -.17$, $p < .05$). Simple slopes analysis again clarified that this interaction was driven by the experimental conditions having a significant effect only among those low in empathic concern ($b = 0.57, p < .001$) and not among those high in empathic concern ($b = 0.17, p < .001$).3

**Attentiveness toward the recipient.** Finally, we considered the effect of the experimental conditions on participants’ attentiveness toward the recipient. This analysis indicated a significant effect of experimental condition, $F(2, 74) = 10.41, p < .001, \eta^2 = .22$, with those in the status condition expressing significantly more attention toward the recipient ($M = 5.52, SD = 0.91$) than those in the control ($M = 4.73, SD = 1.06$), $F(1, 74) = 6.41, p < .01, \eta^2 = .08$, or the power ($M = 4.03, SD = 1.43$), $F(1, 74) = 20.71, p < .001, \eta^2 = .22$, conditions; the control and power conditions were also significantly different from one another, $F(1, 74) = 4.73, p < .05, \eta^2 = .06$. Regression analysis revealed that this effect was moderated by relational self-construal, with significant effects of experimental condition ($\beta = .42, p < .001$) and its interaction with RISC ($\beta = -.24, p < .05$). The simple slopes indicated a significant effect of the experimental conditions when relational self-construal was low ($b = 0.94, p < .001$) but not when it was high ($b = 0.14, ns$). With regard to empathic concern, regression analysis indicated significant effects of experimental condition ($\beta = .37, p < .001$) and empathic concern ($\beta = .33, p < .001$) and a marginally significant interaction between them ($\beta = -.18, p = .063$). Although the interaction was only marginally significant, the simple slopes suggested that the experimental conditions had a significant effect only among those low in empathic concern ($b = 0.75, p < .001$) and not among those high in empathic concern ($b = 0.21, p < .001$).

**Discussion**

Study 3 provides additional support for our hypotheses, again demonstrating that status and power exert differential effects on procedural justice. In this study, we found evidence for these effects on procedural justice as rated by independent, uninvolved parties as well as on the actor’s concern over procedural justice. The results indicate that status increased, and power attenuated, both the concern over and enactment of procedural justice. In addition, in Study 3 we examined another index of how participants approached the social encounter, their attentiveness toward the recipient, and found a similar pattern of effects for status and power, providing direct evidence for our reasoning that while status prompts attention to others, power has the opposite effect. Notably, however, the effect of power on these dependent variables varied as a function of the individual’s other orientation (as indexed by dispositional relational self-construal and empathic concern). Overall, Study 3 replicates and extends the findings of Study 2, showing the same overall pattern of effects as in Study 2—but in a managerial context rather than in a negotiation setting and with dependent variables that closely relate to the mechanisms underlying our conceptual arguments.

**Study 4**

Having demonstrated that status and power can have opposing effects on people’s justice behaviors toward others, our goal in Study 4 was to conduct a more nuanced and comprehensive examination of the effects of status and power on justice. We did so by expanding the design from our first three studies and orthogonally manipulating status and power, enabling us to examine not only their differential effects on justice but also their independent and interactive effects. This approach is consistent with our argument that they represent distinct and separable dimensions of hierarchy. Moreover, evidence of interactive effects would further validate the argument that status and power are distinct constructs exerting differential effects on fairness.

Similar to Study 3, Study 4 relied on a leadership role-playing design to examine another common, yet challenging, justice-focused situation that high-ranked parties often encounter: the allocation of benefits among group members. In particular, we focused on the equity norm of distributive justice, examining how power and status affect the degree to which resource-allocation decisions reflect sensitivity to distributing resources on the basis of equity. We conceptualized and focused on equity as our instantiation of distributive justice for this study since it is one of the leading distributive-justice norms—particularly in work contexts, which served as the setting for Study 4 (Adams, 1965; Blader & Tyler, 2003; Colquitt, 2001; Grandey, 2001; Greenberg, 1987; Kabanoiff, 1991; Leventhal, 1980)—and because prior research has likewise emphasized equity as a primary instantiation of distributive justice (focusing on the same type of allocation task that we examined in Study 4; Meindl, 1989).

**Method**

**Participants and design.** Participants were 59 students who were pursuing a master’s degree in business administration and who volunteered to participate in this study in exchange for entry into a lottery for two $80 prizes. The average age of the participants was 29 years; 34% were women. They had an average of 7 years’ work experience. The study consisted of a $2 \times 2$ between-subjects design, with manipulations of status (low, high) and power (low, high).

**Procedure.** Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. They were told that the study was designed to examine how leaders make important decisions, so they would be asked to play the role of a division president at a major firm. They were then provided with some detailed information about the firm—to make the study as realistic as possible for this sample—and were also given information about the character that they were role-playing. The status and power manipulations were embedded in this character description. They were then

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3 As might be expected, the perceived importance of these procedural justice elements mediated the effect of the experimental conditions on ratings of the procedural justice of the memos. In an analysis of covariance examining mediation (Muller, Yzerbyt, & Judd, 2008), with ratings of procedural justice as the dependent variable, including perceived importance of procedural justice as a covariate, $F(1, 73) = 9.15, p < .01, \eta^2 = .11$, reduced the effect of the experimental conditions to marginal significance, $F(2, 73) = 2.54, p < .10$.
informed that their primary task was to allocate bonus money among the four department managers who report directly to them. Performance information about these managers was provided in the form of the percentage of target sales goals achieved by each of the four departments: Two had achieved 150% of their goals, and two had achieved 75% of their goals.4 Participants allocated the bonus money among these department managers and then completed a questionnaire that included all of our dependent measures.

Independent variables. The manipulations were embedded in the character descriptions. Low-/high-power participants were informed

You are recognized as one of the least (most) powerful division managers within the company, and your division is widely recognized as one of the least (most) important divisions companywide. As a result, your division is allocated one of the smallest (largest) budgets in the firm, and you have control over a relatively meager (unusually large) amount of resources, compared with your colleagues in other divisions.

Low-/high-status was manipulated by informing participants

You have a somewhat negative (very positive) reputation, and you command relatively little (a great deal of) status in the firm. You do not have (do have) the sense that your peers and your subordinates particularly like or respect you (your peers and your subordinates really like and respect you), and you also feel somewhat excluded from (like a very well-accepted part of) the top management team. Indeed, you possess little (a great deal of) esteem within the firm.

Manipulation checks. To verify the success of our power manipulation, we asked participants to indicate their agreement with the item, “The division president (whose role you are playing) has control over a lot of resources.” To verify the success of our status manipulation, we asked participants to indicate their agreement with two items: “The division president (whose role you are playing) is held in high regard at work,” and “The division president (whose role you are playing) is widely accepted by others at work” \( (r = .89) \).

Dispositional measures. We investigated whether an individual’s other orientation moderates the negative effect of power on justice behavior by examining two indicators of other orientation: First, consistent with Studies 2 and 3, we examined the moderating effect of empathic concern, using the same scale used in those studies (Study 4 \( \alpha = .72 \)). Second, we examined another index of other orientation—communal orientation (Clark & Mills, 1979). Communal orientation captures the extent to which an individual is dispositionally oriented toward focusing on and meeting others’ needs, and, as such, it is often examined as an indicator of the degree of an individuals’ other orientation. Our examination of communal orientation enabled us not only to extend our findings to another moderating variable—thus verifying the generalizability of our findings—but also to replicate prior findings in the power literature that have examined how communal orientation moderates the effects of power (Chen et al., 2001). We assessed communal orientation using the scale developed by Clark, Oullette, Powell, and Milberg (1987). Sample items include “When making a decision, I take other people’s needs and feelings into account,” and “I often go out of my way to help another person” \( (\alpha = .73) \). Participants completed these measures several weeks prior to participating in the study.

Dependent variable. As indicated previously, we operationalized distributive justice in this study as the degree of equity sensitivity reflected in participants’ bonus-allocation decisions. Bonuses were allocated among targets who differed in their performance; thus, greater differentiation in the amount of bonus money given to targets at different performance levels provides an index of the extent to which participants incorporated equity concerns into their judgments. Greater differentiation (i.e., larger differences in the amount of bonus money given to low- vs. high-performing targets) reflects a stronger role of equity, while weaker differentiation reflects a weaker emphasis on equity and, potentially, less attention overall to social targets in the environment. Therefore, our primary dependent variable was based on the two within-subject judgments that participants made about the proportion of total bonus money to allocate to targets achieving 75% or 150% of their sales goals.

Results

Manipulation checks. Results indicated that our power manipulation was successful. Participants in the high- (vs. low-)power condition indicated stronger agreement that the character they were role-playing “had control over a lot of resources” \( (M = 4.96, SD = 1.09, vs. M = 3.85, SD = 1.53) \), \( F(1, 55) = 10.13, p < .001, \eta^2 = .16 \), and there was no effect of the status manipulation, \( F(1, 55) = 1.70, ns, \eta^2 = .03 \), or their interaction, \( F(1, 55) = .01, ns, \eta^2 = .00 \). Similarly, results indicated that our status manipulation was successful. Participants in the high- (vs. low-)status condition indicated stronger agreement that they were held in high regard and accepted by others \( (M = 5.13, SD = 0.53, vs. M = 2.13, SD = 0.97) \), \( F(1, 55) = 218.66, p < .001, \eta^2 = .79 \). There was no effect of the power manipulation, \( F(1, 55) = 0.60, ns, \eta^2 = .01 \), or their interaction, \( F(1, 55) = 0.01, ns, \eta^2 = .00 \).

Equity sensitivity. Means on our primary dependent measure, by condition, are presented in Table 3. To test the effects of status and power on equity sensitivity, we conducted an analysis of variance with the proportion of bonus money given to each of the two performance groups (i.e., to each of the two target groups that varied in their performance) as a within-subject factor and our power and status manipulations as between-subjects factors. The results of this analysis indicate support for our hypothesis. More specifically, we found a significant Status \( \times \) Bonus Allocation interaction, \( F(1, 55) = 6.03, p < .05, \eta^2 = .10 \), reflecting the larger average spread in the proportion of bonus money allocated to the low- versus high-performing groups (i.e., greater equity sensitivity) among the high-status conditions \( (M = 0.56, SD = 0.18) \) compared with the low-status conditions \( (M = 0.46, SD = 0.14) \). We also found a marginally significant Power \( \times \) Bonus Allocation interaction, \( F(1, 55) = 3.33, p < .10, \eta^2 = .06 \), reflecting a tendency toward a larger spread in the proportion of bonus money allocated to the low- and high-performing groups

4 Because of asymmetries in the salience and weight put on positive versus negative information, we did not make the high and low performers equally distant from their original performance goals. Pilot testing confirmed that this was useful for more closely calibrating the performance of these two groups. Nevertheless, the results of this study do not rely on calibration of the performance differentials since our focus is on differences between conditions.
Table 3

Study 4: Mean Proportions and Standard Deviations of Money Allocated by Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>At 75% of goals</th>
<th>At 150% of goals</th>
<th>Spread</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low status</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High status</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low status</td>
<td>.269</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High status</td>
<td>.262</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.738</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

among the low-power conditions ($M = 0.55$, $SD = 0.18$) than among the high-power conditions ($M = 0.47$, $SD = 0.15$).

However, these findings were qualified by a significant Status $\times$ Power $\times$ Bonus Allocation interaction, $F(1, 55) = 4.43, p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .08$. Examination of the average proportion of bonus money allocated to each of the two classes of targets by status and power condition reveals the form of this interaction. As Table 3 shows, when power was low, status led to significantly greater differentiation in bonus allocations, as reflected in the spread in the proportion of bonus money allocated between the two groups. This indicates that status led to greater equity sensitivity when power was low. However, when power was high, status did not impact the proportion of bonus money allocated to each of the performance categories, and allocations among the high-power conditions indicated less equity sensitivity than that in the low-power, high-status condition. Thus, it appears that, in this context, high power attenuated the justice-enhancing effects of status. Alternatively, the interaction might be interpreted as indicating that power only had an effect when status was low and not when it was high.

We next tested our prediction that the effect of power would vary as a function of participants’ other orientation, as indexed by their level of empathic concern and communal orientation. To conduct this test, we again followed the procedures recommended by Aiken & West (1991) and performed a regression analysis that included power, status, one of our moderating other-orientation variables (i.e., empathic concern or communal orientation), Power $\times$ Status, and the focal Power $\times$ Other-Orientation Variable interaction as our independent variables. Our dependent variable was the spread between the two bonus allocations. First, we conducted this analysis using participants’ dispositional empathic concern as our other-orientation index, which revealed a significant effect of status ($\beta = .49, p < .001$) and, most important, our predicted Power $\times$ Empathic Concern interaction ($\beta = .44, p < .01$). The simple slopes indicate that the pattern of the interaction was as we predicted: Power had a negative effect on equity sensitivity among participants low in empathic concern ($b = 0.17, p < .01$), but not among those high in empathic concern ($b = -0.01, ns$). Second, we examined participants’ communal orientation. This regression also revealed a significant effect of status ($\beta = .48, p < .001$) and, most important, our predicted Power $\times$ Communal Orientation interaction ($\beta = .38, p < .01$). The simple slopes indicate that the pattern of the interaction was as we predicted: Power had a negative effect on equity sensitivity among participants low in communal orientation ($b = -0.16, p < .05$) but not among those high in communal orientation ($b = -0.002, ns$).

Discussion

Study 4 further supports our key arguments. We found that status led to greater equity sensitivity—that is, greater differentiation in the amount of bonus money allocated to the low- versus high-performance groups—while power had the opposite effect. This suggests that, as we predicted, status led to greater consideration and use of information about others and, thus, greater distributive justice, while power led to less consideration and use of such information and, thus, less distributive justice. However, we also found evidence that when individuals’ dispositions led them to be more other oriented (by being either high in empathic concern or high in communal orientation), power no longer led to weaker differentiation between social targets. This moderating pattern supports that the effect of power will depend on a person’s disposition. It also substantiates our reasoning that differentiation in allocations to low- and high-performing groups—our measure of equity sensitivity—is rooted in the degree of attention to and consideration of social targets. This is further supported by our demonstration of these effects using two different indices of other orientation, one of which has been an important focus in prior power research (Chen et al., 2001).

A valuable element of Study 4 is our focus on distributive justice and, in particular, on our approach to conceptualizing distributive justice as the enactment of equity via resource-allocation decisions (building on prior research—for example, Meindl, 1989). This approach removes self-interest as a potential motivation (which was not the case with Study 1), and therefore, we have evidence that power and status impact distributive justice even in situations in which the self (and self-interest) is not directly involved. This is important since group authorities—and, indeed, all decision makers—often face such situations, and their decisions provide the foundation for the distributive justice that group members commonly encounter. Therefore, it is valuable to examine how status and power impact distributive justice in these types of situations. It is important to be clear that in these (or other) situations, we do not associate status and power directly with equity (or with any distribution principle) but rather with the group’s prevailing distribution norms and widespread attitudes. Status increases concern with those norms (regardless of what they are), while power provokes less concern.

It is worth noting that an alternative interpretation of our findings is that weaker equity sensitivity in our participants’ allocation decisions reflects greater concern for a different distributive norm: equality. While such an explanation is possible, we do not find this interpretation as feasible as our current interpretation. First, as noted, equity is widely regarded as the dominant norm in work contexts such as that examined in Study 4. Second, there is little theoretical basis for expecting that power would lead to greater equality. That is, there is little reason to think that high-power parties would be more concerned with or drawn toward the implementation of an equality-distributive norm. Third, we found that participants high in other orientation do not demonstrate the negative effect of power—and, thus, they demonstrated relatively
high levels of differentiation in their bonus-allocation decisions regardless of power. This is difficult to reconcile with an alternate explanation rooted in equality, since we would expect that those high in other orientation might be relatively more likely to exercise the equality principle since equality is more closely associated with situations in which relational concerns dominate (Deutsch, 1975, 1985). More generally, communal orientation and empathic concern both orient individuals toward the needs and expectations of others and toward the preservation of group harmony. In the absence of individuating information about those needs and expectations, we expect that they rely on group norms (which, in the context of the current study, are likely equity norms). When others’ needs and expectations are clearer, these dispositions may prompt attention to those needs and expectations, potentially leading to a different pattern of effects.

It is possible that the current set of findings emerged because of the increased cognitive effort required by equity. Indeed, equity requires more cognitive effort than equality, and this may underlie our finding that power reduced accordance with equity norms since power holders may tend to engage in less effortful processing when no clear personal gain is present (Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Overbeck & Park, 2006). While consistent with our reasoning that power reduces attention to information about others, it suggests a more cognitively focused explanation for that effect. In future research, investigators should consider the role of this elaboration on the underlying mechanism by which power leads to a reduced focus on equity.

In Study 5, we sought to replicate and extend Study 4 by using a more involving experimental paradigm. Therefore, we returned to the negotiation context used in Study 2 but chose a more complex negotiation situation in which interpersonal dynamics were particularly important. Study 5 also provided us with another opportunity to orthogonally manipulate status and power and to determine whether the main and interactive effects we found in Study 4 replicate when the dependent variable is procedural, rather than distributive, justice. Finally, Study 5 expanded our investigation of the moderating effect of people’s dispositions, examining moderating influences on the effects of both power and status. This latter extension enabled us to further test the generalizability of our predicted moderating effects and to further explore the mechanism underlying our findings.

Study 5

In Study 5, we extended our earlier studies by examining the main and interactive effects of status and power in a richer, more engaging situation than in Study 4, one in which participants interacted with one another. More specifically, in Study 5 status and power were examined in an integrative negotiation context, a more complex type of negotiation than that examined in Study 2. As in Study 2, our dependent variables included procedural justice (as rated by an interaction partner) and first offers. We also examined another dependent variable that we believed would be significantly affected by the differentiation between status and power in this context: the likelihood that the parties would reach an integrative agreement. Our rationale was that if status and power differentially impact people’s attentiveness to others’ needs and perspectives (thus affecting how fairly people act toward their interaction partner), then they should also have differing effects on the likelihood of reaching an integrative agreement, since reaching such an agreement relies largely on perspective taking (Trotschel, Huffmeier, Loschelder, Schwartz, & Gollwitzer, in press). Furthermore, our reasoning also suggested that status and power should have different effects on the development of trust between the parties, which is likewise critical to creating value and identifying integrative solutions. More generally, we examined integrative agreements as an important barometer of the quality of an interpersonal interaction.

Method

Participants and design. Participants were 208 students pursuing a master’s degree in business administration. The study was part of an in-class activity in a course on negotiations and conflict resolution. Participants were 29 years old, on average, and 45% were women. The study consisted of a 2 × 2 between-subjects design, with manipulations of status (low, high) and power (low, high).

Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. The study was based on the Texoil negotiation simulation (Goldberg, 1997), which is a dyadic negotiation involving two parties who are meeting to discuss the sale of a service station. Participants were randomly assigned to either the buyer or the seller role, resulting in 104 dyads. The seller was the local owner–operator of the station; the buyer was the vice president of operations at the Texoil Corporation. The initial circumstances precluded a mutually agreeable sale price, and thus, the parties could reach agreement only by including additional elements into the deal. Identifying these integrative elements was unlikely unless the parties adopted a somewhat cooperative stance and exchanged information about their underlying interests, making the development of trust and a mutual focus on both parties’ goals critical for reaching a mutually beneficial deal.5

All parties received a general information sheet, followed by extensive role information. Our experimental manipulations were embedded in the role materials of the buyer (i.e., the Texoil representative)—the party with relatively higher rank in this interaction. As in Study 2, participants were unaware that there were any differences among the buyer’s role materials. Participants were randomly paired with their negotiation opponents and were given 40 min to negotiate. When their negotiations were complete, all dyads completed an agreement sheet and also individually completed questionnaires; our dependent variables were assessed via these forms. Participants were then debriefed regarding the exercise and the experimental manipulations. No participants indicated any knowledge regarding the existence or nature of the study. Participants were contacted after the conclusion of the course for permission to use the data from their simulations for research purposes; 100% of them gave permission.

Experimental manipulations. The manipulations were embedded in the buyer’s role materials. Low (high) power was manipulated by informing participants

5 In this particular negotiation, an integrative agreement relies primarily on the parties reaching a deal in which the seller is offered guaranteed employment after the sale closes. This serves the critical interests of both parties.
Your position in the company is the vice president of operations. You have relatively little (a great deal of) power within the company since you manage one of the smallest (largest) budgets, and you control a relatively minor (major) portion of the organization’s resources.

Low (high) status was manipulated by informing participants that

After many years of working at Texoil, you have attained very little (a great deal of) status or (and) prestige within the company. People at the organization seem to have little respect for you (to genuinely respect you) and seem to hold you in low (high) regard. This lack of admiration for you (the admiration people have for you) is something that you have given up trying to change (that you really value).

Dispositional measures. Participants completed all dispositional measures 2 weeks before participating in the study. We examined three indices of other-orientation—RISC, empathic concern, and communal orientation—in Study 5, focusing on consistency with our prior studies. For all three measures, we used the same scales as in the prior studies. We also included a dispositional measure related to our proposed mechanism for the status effects we predicted. Specifically, we measured participants’ dispositional concern about maintaining their status position by having them complete the Status-Concern Scale (Blader & Chen, 2011). This measure assesses an individual’s tendency to be concerned about status and about maintaining his or her status position. A critical element of our argument is that concerns about maintaining one’s status position lead people to focus outward toward social targets, which, in turn, leads them to treat others more fairly so as to sustain social regard from those targets. To the extent that our reasoning is correct, we expected stronger effects of status on justice behavior among those who had a stronger concern about maintaining their status position by having them complete the Status-Concern Scale (Blader & Chen, 2011). This measure assesses an individual’s tendency to be concerned about status and about maintaining his or her status position. A critical element of our argument is that concerns about maintaining one’s status position lead people to focus outward toward social targets, which, in turn, leads them to treat others more fairly so as to sustain social regard from those targets. To the extent that our reasoning is correct, we expected stronger effects of status on justice behavior among those who had a stronger concern about status. The scale includes 10 items with such statements as “I try to maintain my status in my interactions with others,” and “I maintain my status. The scale includes 10 items with such statements as “I try to maintain my status in my interactions with others,” and “I maintain my status. The scale includes 10 items with such statements as “I try to maintain my status in my interactions with others,” and “I maintain my status. The scale includes 10 items with such statements as “I try to maintain my status in my interactions with others,” and “I maintain my status.

Manipulation checks. We used the same manipulation checks that we used in Study 2. In addition, we included an additional item: “How important was it to you that your negotiation opponent treat you like someone who is powerful?”

Table 4

Study 5: Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations Between Scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Status&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Power&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td>.03</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Procedural justice</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Make first offer&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Amount of first offer&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>271.25</td>
<td>108.25</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-35</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Integrative?&lt;sup&gt;ad&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-08</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Relational self-construal</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Empathic concern</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Communal orientation</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Status maintenance</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. N = 112. All rs ≥ .2 are significant at p < .05.
<sup>a</sup> Coded as low = 0, high = 1.  <sup>b</sup> Coded as buyer = 0, seller = 1.  <sup>d</sup> Includes only cases where buyer made the first offer (in $100,000s).  <sup>ad</sup> Coded as no = 0, yes = 1.
low-power condition ($M = 4.25$, $SD = 1.72$, vs. $M = 3.56$, $SD = 1.60$), $F(1, 100) = 4.38$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .04$, and there was no effect of the status manipulation, $F(1, 100) = 0.18$, $ns$, $\eta^2 = .00$, or their interaction, $F(1, 100) = 2.31$, $ns$, $\eta^2 = .02$.

**Procedural justice.** Results strongly confirmed our key hypothesis. Sellers’ ratings of the procedural justice they experienced in their encounter with the buyer varied significantly as a function of status (low $M = 4.39$, $SD = 0.95$, vs. high $M = 4.76$, $SD = 1.18$), $F(1, 100) = 3.99$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .04$, and power (low $M = 4.81$, $SD = 1.08$, vs. high $M = 4.37$, $SD = 1.05$), $F(1, 100) = 4.45$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .04$. Note that there was also a significant Status $\times$ Power interaction, $F(1, 100) = 13.29$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .12$. The form of this interaction indicated that when power was low, status significantly influenced the buyer’s fairness behavior in the encounter (low $M = 4.24$, $SD = 0.95$, vs. high $M = 5.35$, $SD = 0.93$), $F(1, 100) = 15.34$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .27$, whereas status did not impact fairness behavior in the high-power conditions (low $M = 4.54$, $SD = 0.94$, vs. high $M = 4.22$, $SD = 1.14$), $F(1, 100) = 1.41$, $ns$, $\eta^2 = .02$, replicating the interaction pattern found in Study 4. As in Study 4, the interaction could also be interpreted as indicating that power had an effect only when status was low and not when it was high.

We next tested our prediction that the effect of the power would vary as a function of participants’ dispositional other orientation. We used three indices of other orientation in this study—RISC, empathic concern, and communal orientation—and followed the procedures recommended by Aiken & West (1991) for testing moderation, conducting regression analyses to determine whether each of the three dispositional variables shapes the impact of power on procedural justice. These regression analyses, presented in Table 5, support our prediction that other-oriented dispositional measures moderate the effect of power on procedural justice.

We conducted follow-up analyses to more closely examine the nature of the significant two-way interactions presented in Table 5; in all cases, these analyses indicated that the negative effect of power on procedural justice was attenuated among individuals who were highly other oriented. When RISC was the moderator, we found that power had a negative effect on procedural justice among those with weak RISC ($b = -.68$, $p < .05$) and not among those with stronger RISC ($b = .08$, $ns$). Similarly, when empathic concern was the moderator, we found that power had a negative effect on procedural justice among those low in empathic concern ($b = -.89$, $p < .001$) but not among those high in empathic concern ($b = .23$, $ns$). Finally, when communal orientation was the moderator, we found that power had a negative effect on procedural justice among those with weak communal orientation ($b = -.90$, $p < .001$) but not among those with stronger communal orientation ($b = .07$, $ns$).

We also examined the effect of a dispositional measure of people’s general concern about status, which, according to our reasoning, should moderate the impact of status on procedural justice. The results, also presented in Table 5, support our prediction insofar as they indicate a significant Status $\times$ Status Concern interaction on procedural justice. Follow-up analyses indicated that, as expected, the positive effect of status on procedural justice primarily emerged among those high in status concern ($b = .87$, $p < .001$) and not among those low in status concern ($b = -.17$, $ns$). These findings support our prediction that those most attuned to status concerns would be more strongly influenced by variations in their status position.

**Initiation of the first offer.** Logistic regression analysis was used to examine the effects of status and power on who made the first offer. The results of the analysis revealed an effect of power ($b = -1.97$, $p < .05$), exp$(B) = .14$, and a Status $\times$ Power interaction ($b = 2.47$, $p < .05$), exp$(B) = 11.78$. Replicating past findings on the effect of power on first-offer initiation (Magee et al., 2007), we found that when power was low, the buyer (i.e., the Texol representative) was less likely to initiate the first offer than when power was high (low power = 57%; high power = 68%). However, the greater tendency for high- (vs. low-)power individuals to initiate the first offer varied as a function of status. In particular, the effect was accentuated among participants in the low-status condition, with low-power participants making the first offer 55% of the time and high-power participants making the first offer 90% of the time, $\chi^2 = 5.80$, $p < .05$. In contrast, power had

<table>
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<th>Table 5</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Study 5: Regression Analyses, Procedural Justice</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable: Procedural justice</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Moderator | * | 0.01 | 0.15 | * | 0.06 | 0.13 | 0.06 | * | -0.01 | 0.12 | -0.06 | 0.03 | 0.17 | 0.03 | *
| Interactions: | Power $\times$ Status | -1.54 | 0.34 | -0.68 | *** | -1.43 | 0.34 | -0.63 | *** | -1.50 | 0.35 | -0.66 | *** | -2.02 | 0.36 | -0.88 | *** |
| Power $\times$ Moderator | 0.53 | 0.18 | 0.43 | ** | 0.51 | 0.17 | 0.38 | ** | 0.53 | 0.17 | 0.37 | ** | 0.66 | 0.20 | 0.53 | ** |
| Total adjusted $R^2$ | 33% | 34% | 30% | 45% |

**Note.** $N = 112$.

* Indicates moderator variable labeled as column heading (i.e., relational interdependence, empathic concern, communal orientation, status-maintenance concerns) above each set of results.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. 
a nonsignificant effect in the high-status conditions, $\chi^2 = 0.54$, $p < .05$, although there was a trend toward a reversal whereby low-power participants made the first offer 60% of the time and high-power participants made the first offer 48% of the time. We also examined the dollar amount of the first offers made by buyers who made the first offer, where power condition had the only significant effect, $F(1, 44) = 6.23, p < .001, \eta^2 = .12$. As would be expected, first offers were lower when buyers making the first offer were in the high- (vs. low-)power condition ($M = 239, SD = 90$, vs. $M = 317, SD = 119$).

Likelihood of reaching an integrative agreement. Next, we examined the effect of status and power on the likelihood that the parties would reach an integrative agreement. Logistic regression analysis revealed a significant effect of status ($b = 3.17, p < .001$) $\exp(b) = 23.83$, and a marginally significant Status $\times$ Power interaction ($b = -2.27, p < .10$) $\exp(b) = .10$. The pattern of results was consistent with that found for our procedural justice dependent variable. That is, when power was low, there was a strong effect of status on integrative agreements, with dyads in the low-status condition accounting for only 7.4% of integrative agreements but dyads in the high-status condition accounting for 50% of integrative agreements, $\chi^2 = 12.46, p < .001$. However, when power was high, status did not have an impact on integrative agreements, $\chi^2 = 1.11, ns$, with dyads in the low-status condition accounting for 19% and dyads in the high-status condition accounting for 26% of integrative agreements.

Discussion

Study 5 strongly supports the arguments advanced in this research. Once again, we found that status and power each impact justice (in this study, procedural justice) but that they do so in opposite ways. Our participants’ sense of the status of the character they were playing was positively associated with their procedural fairness behavior (as rated by their interaction partner). In contrast, participants’ sense of the power of the character they were playing was negatively associated with their procedural fairness behavior. Notably, we found the same interaction between status and power that we found in Study 4: Our predicted effects of status emerged primarily when power was low. In these studies, we found that when power was high, it overwhelmed the effect of status. We discuss this interaction pattern in greater detail below in the General Discussion.

The results of Study 5 also replicated the moderating impact of the dispositional factors we considered. We found consistent evidence of moderation of our power effects across three indices of other orientation (relational self-construal, empathic concern, and communal orientation). These findings provide rather robust evidence that our predicted negative effects of power occur primarily among those low on other-oriented dispositions. Furthermore, we also found a moderating variable of our predicted status effect. We found that the positive effect of status emerged primarily among those dispositionally predisposed to be concerned about status, supporting our argument that status leads higher ranked parties to act fairly toward others because doing so facilitates their status-maintenance goals. These findings strongly support our reasoning about the underlying mechanisms by which status and power shape justice.

Furthermore, this study went beyond exploring the effects of status and power on justice to investigate their impact on two important elements of the negotiation: making the first offer and reaching integrative agreements. With regard to making the first offer, we extended the findings in Study 2 and past work (Magee et al., 2007) by showing that while power increases the propensity to make first offers, this effect is moderated by status. This interaction effect between power and status provides additional support for our key prediction regarding the distinction between power and status, and it does so with regard to an important index of approach-oriented behavior (Magee et al., 2007). The moderating effect of status on the relationship between power and approach behavior supports our reasoning that while high-power parties tend to focus on themselves and their own goals, status leads higher ranked parties to focus on others and on relational elements of their interactions with others.

Finally, with regard to the likelihood of reaching an integrative agreement, we found a positive effect of status. This, too, supports our reasoning about the way status impacts higher ranked parties’ interactions with others. This is because integrative agreements rely largely on perspective taking and the cultivation of high-quality, trustful interpersonal interactions, which are made more likely by the attentiveness to and concern for others that status prompts. These findings provide further support for our reasoning that status and power exert differential effects on interpersonal interactions and that they do so not only for justice but also for other types of relationally focused outcomes such as value-creating integrative agreements.

General Discussion

These five studies strongly support our predictions about the effects of status and power on justice enacted toward others. As expected, we found consistent evidence that high status was associated with relatively greater fairness, while, in contrast, high power was associated with relatively less fairness. This evidence emerged across a variety of experimental paradigms and on multiple forms of justice (distributive and procedural). Furthermore, in Studies 2, 3, and 5, we found additional converging evidence of the differential effects of status and power by examining additional outcomes, including approaches to the encounter and an index of the nature of the interaction between the parties (embodied in the likelihood of reaching an integrative agreement). Overall, these results highlight the importance of differentiating status from power, as well as the value of doing so by examining their differing impact on the relational dynamics between interacting parties.

Notably, while Studies 1, 2, and 3 directly contrasted status and power, Studies 4 and 5 orthogonally crossed them. Thus, Studies 4 and 5 provided an opportunity to examine both main and interactive effects of status and power. All five studies found consistent main effects, supporting our prediction that variation in the level of status and power have reliable—but opposing—effects on justice. Moreover, Studies 4 and 5 revealed a similar interaction pattern that qualified those main effects. In particular, they found that the effect of status depended on the participant’s level of power, with positive effects of status on justice emerging among those low in power, but not among those high in power. Indeed, high power reduced the effect of status to nonsignificance. This intriguing
interaction pattern suggests that while status and power are indeed distinct dimensions, when both are present, power may be a more dominant force than status. That is, power appears to override the positive effect of status on justice behaviors toward others. We further consider this element of our findings in the following.

Theoretical Implications

The current research makes important contributions to the literatures on status, power, and justice. Perhaps most important, it indicates that researchers investigating hierarchical relations and social stratification should be clear about whether their focus is on status or on power; and, more generally, they should be mindful of confounding these two distinct dimensions of hierarchy. While theorists have been defining status and power differently for decades (e.g., Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 2010; Goldhamer & Shils, 1939; Hall et al., 2005; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Ridgeway & Walker, 1995; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985), relatively less work has empirically demonstrated their distinct effects, and much research continues to treat these dimensions as interchangeable. This, in turn, makes it difficult to achieve empirically based, refined conceptual clarity about status and power (Fiske, 2010; Magee & Galinsky, 2008) and to develop a comprehensive understanding of the distinct antecedents, processes, and consequences associated with each.

In shedding greater light on distinctions between the psychology of status and power, the current research also contributes to each of these respective literatures. For instance, the status literature has focused on the antecedents of status (e.g., Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006), the benefits of status, or the psychological dynamics of holding low status (Crocker & Major, 1989; Jackman, 1994; Jost & Banaji, 1994), but there has been relatively less work on how status holders approach and interact with others. The current research suggests important interpersonal consequences of holding higher status, since high-status parties may be particularly oriented toward their relations with others and particularly attentive to the perspectives of their interaction partners. The current findings likewise contribute to the power literature by demonstrating the interpersonal consequences of power and, more specifically, the interpersonal consequences that can follow from the tendency of high-power parties to orient their focus inward.

Furthermore, the moderating effects investigated in the current research provide additional insight into the psychology of status and power. They confirm that the effect of power on justice is attributable to power holders’ other orientation (or lack thereof) since power did not have a negative effect on justice among those with a dispositional tendency to focus on others. Similarly, the results confirm that the effect of status on justice is attributable to status holders’ status-maintenance concerns, as status had a strong effect among those with a dispositional tendency to focus on their status position. These findings are consistent with the mechanism of why power and status exert the impact on justice that we predict and find in these studies.

The current findings also make an important contribution to the justice literature, which has given relatively little consideration to factors that shape whether higher ranked parties treat others in a fair or unfair manner. Research on the psychology of justice has focused mainly on justice recipients, paying relatively less attention to the psychology of justice among higher ranked parties, even though these are the individuals who are primarily responsible for creating justice or injustice in the first place (Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003; Scott, Colquitt, & Paddock, 2009). The scarce research that has been done on antecedents of justice has examined personality factors (e.g., Mayer, Nishii, Schneider, & Goldstein, 2007) or subordinate characteristics (e.g., Korsgaard, Roberson, & Rymph, 1998) but not the social–psychological motives that shape the experience of holding higher rank. The current studies address the need for empirical research on the social–psychological determinants of justice, and they do so by focusing on two elements that are fundamental to holding a high-ranked position. Indeed, it is difficult to think of group authorities such as policemen, civic leaders, and corporate managers without thinking about the status and power they hold. This contribution to the justice literature is further enhanced by our focus on both distributive and procedural justice. Overall, this research calls attention to the importance of identifying systematic factors that ultimately determine whether group members encounter justice or injustice in their dealings with group authorities.

Limitations and Future Research

Though supporting our key hypotheses, these studies have a number of limitations that suggest important avenues for future research. For instance, given our focus on experimentally manipulating status and power, we were unable to examine status and power dynamics among parties who actually hold higher rank. It is quite likely that the effects of status and power—as well as the interrelationship between them—would become more complicated in real social situations in which status and power are actually earned. In real situations, motives other than those directly related to status and power also operate, such as social comparison concerns, concerns related to a group’s welfare, self-interest, and so on. Moreover, the bases of status and power may vary across contexts (Huberman et al., 2004). In some contexts, the respect that is central to status conferral is based on dominance and an egocentric focus (Mazur, 1985), while in other contexts, power can be achieved only through attention to others’ needs and perspectives (Fiske, 1992). Moreover, status and power may be causally related to one another (Thye, Willer, & Markovsky, 2006), further complicating their effects on justice in real social situations. In such cases, we might expect the pattern of effects found in this research (including the interaction between power and status) to vary. However, it is important to note that our predicted effects consistently emerged across five studies when the bases of status and power were not explicitly indicated. This suggests that our conceptualizations of status and power largely reflect people’s default conceptualizations of these constructs.

Another limitation of our studies is that they only examine a limited range of dependent variables. However, since our findings actually suggest that status and power exert differential effects across a broad range of dependent variables, a promising contribution of these studies is that they highlight the importance of directly investigating the effects of both status and power on a wide range of outcomes. Consider, for example, our finding that status alters an important finding from the power literature: While prior research has shown that power increases the propensity to make first offers (Magee et al., 2007), we found that status actually...
has the opposite effect. Many other important effects may likewise vary when the focus is on status rather than on power (and vice versa). Our studies highlight that researchers should determine whether conclusions drawn in prior work apply to status, power, or both.

There are at least two additional limitations of the current research—and thus important avenues for future research. First, the audience (i.e., source of status conferral) in all of our studies was the justice recipient. However, our processes may well unfold in the presence of any party who is a potential source of status conferral—including third-party observers. The second limitation concerns the interaction between status and power. Our interpretation of this interaction is that power dominates; in our studies, we interpret our interaction as indicating that power overrode the effects of status on justice. But it is not clear what underlies this finding or whether it would occur in all cases or for other dependent variables. In other contexts and cultures—particularly those in which relational concerns are more salient and prominent—power may not be quite as dominant, and, thus, high power may not eliminate the effects of status (Chen, Chen, & Portnoy, 2009; Fiske, 1992). Moreover, there may well be situations in which high status actually overrides the negative effect of power. Clearly, future research is needed to provide better understanding of these interactive effects and the factors that determine what form the interaction between status and power will take (if any).

Conclusion

Although status and power are fundamental elements of hierarchy, relatively little empirical work has directly distinguished between them. Justice is essential to healthy social interactions and group functioning, but relatively little work has examined its influence or whether conclusions drawn in prior work apply to status, power, or both. We hope that the current studies represent a first step toward addressing these gaps in these respective literatures. Furthermore, we hope that these studies highlight the importance of bridging these heretofore disconnected research areas.

References


